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 JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
1
 
 
Francesca Klug 
Professorial Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE 
 
 
This opinion examines the approach to date of the courts to ss.3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
extent and nature of judicial deference to statute law, and by implication, Parliamentary sovereignty. The author 
argues that if the scheme of the Act under ss.3 and 4 is correctly applied there is no need for a further doctrine 
of judicial deference to the legislature. As a result the author concludes that provided a Convention right is at 
stake, there should be no legislation which the courts exclude themselves from declaring incompatible simply 
because they consider the subject matter to fall more within Parliament's "responsibility" than their own. At the 
same time she points out that courts should follow the scheme of the Act and where it is not possible, to interpret 
legislation compatibly, the courts should declare the legislation incompatible and leave it to Parliament to amend 
or not as the case may be. 
 
Introduction 
Lord Justice Sedley recently suggested that it is the methodology of adjudication under the European Convention 
on Human Rights ("ECHR"), such as the concept of proportionality, which is going to have the deepest effect on the law 
as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA").
2
 Of equal significance, I would suggest, is the judicial approach to 
the scheme of the Human Rights Act itself, most particularly the interpretation and application of the interpretive 
obligation in s.3 and the power to declare legislation incompatible under s.4 and the construction by the judiciary of a 
principle of deference. 
In this opinion, I argue that there is no need for judges, legal practitioners or academics to develop complex 
theories of judicial deference if the scheme of the Act is properly appreciated and appropriately applied. But, first, it is 
important to disentangle different forms of deference. The issue of concern here is not judicial deference to the 
executive as a decision-maker. This should be a relatively uncontroversial issue provided that the ECHR doctrines on 
legality, necessity and proportionality are accepted. After a slow start,
3
 the signs are that the courts are beginning to 
absorb the Strasboug approach to judicial review. Lord Justice Steyn provided the death throes to the Wednesbury 
reasonableness grounds for review in Daly, at least where Convention rights are at stake.
4
 This approach has broadly 
speaking been followed in most subsequent public law cases.
5
 
 
Deference to the legislature 
The focus of this paper, then, is on judicial deference to the legislature – or, more accurately, deference to 
legislation, given the confusing nature of the (unwritten) British constitution where the executive and legislature are 
mostly impossible to disentangle. 
The quest to re-establish appropriate boundaries between the judiciary and executive/legislature drove the debate 
which preceded Incorporation of the ECHR into UK law. There was concern across the political spectrum, and in judicial 
as well as academic circles, that incorporating broad human rights standards into UK law would lead to the demise of 
the British system of Parliamentary supremacy (or sovereignty) over the courts without the transparency that preceded 
such constitutional earthquakes in other jurisdictions.
6
 Crudely put, the debate concerned whether an elected 
Parliament or unelected courts should have the final say in determining what the law should be in a democracy (as 
distinct from the interpretation of that law).
7
 
There are many ways of characterising this debate.
8
 A recent example can be found in an article by Danny Nicol 
entitled "Are Convention Rights a No-go Zone for Parliament?"
9
 In the one corner he places what he terms 
"incorporationists" who view Convention rights as "elevated beyond the reach of statute and state" which "only an 
independent judiciary, immune from executive domination and above 'faction' can construe".
10
 
                                                     
1
 This opinion was first delivered as a paper to the Society of Public Teachers of Law (SPTL) Conference, De Montfort University, September 2002. 
2
 Sedley, "Colonels in Horsehair", London Review of Books September 2002. 
3
 In R. (on the application Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840, the Court of Appeal had held: "When anxiously 
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 D. Nicol, "Are Convention Rights a no-go Zone for Parliament?" Public Law, Autumn 2002, pp.438-448. 
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 ibid., p.438. 
In Nicol's other corner are "third-wavers"
11
 for whom the HRA is a "unique constitutional instrument designed to 
enable Parliament and government, as well as courts, to participate in giving 'further effect' to fundamental rights". From 
this perspective, "the conception to be accorded to each Convention right is rarely self-evident".
12
 In other words rights 
frequently collide, if not with each other then at the very least with the "pressing social needs" which can in certain 
circumstances legitimately constrain them under the ECHR. When this happens "the demos would appear a better 
forum to decide these issues than the courts".
13
 
 
The background to the Act 
The debate which Nicols articulates concerns the question of when judicial scrutiny of legislation strays into judicial 
creation of legislation. The underlying issue in this debate – the appropriate constitutional boundaries of the judicial 
function – has, of course, a long pedigree in relation to the development of the common law and judicial review of 
executive discretion. But this question did not materially arise in this country in relation to primary legislation before the 
HRA because courts were effectively constitutionally barred from reviewing statutes prior to the enactment of the Act. 
The issue has now become pressing for two main reasons. First, because Convention rights are framed in 
extremely broad and general terms, the usual distinction between legislation and interpretation easily blurs. The ECHR 
is utterly unlike the "black letter" or detailed legislation we are used to in English law. Lord Woolf made this point in 
Poplar when he said that the dividing line between interpretation and legislating would not be easy under the HRA.
14
 
Secondly, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights has developed its doctrine of "a margin of 
appreciation" means that, notwithstanding the limits of its writ in domestic law, there are certain no-go areas for the 
Strasbourg court. This leaves our courts with virtually a blank page on which to determine the meaning of (at least the 
non-derogable) rights in some contexts, or how they should be exercised when they collide. 
In the few years immediately preceding the passing of the HRA the debate about what approach to follow – 
incorporationist or "third wave" in Nicol's terms – focussed on the contrasting approaches of the 1982 Canadian Charter 
of Rights and the 1991 New Zealand Bill of Rights.
15
 The Canadian model could be characterised as judicial 
entrenchment with a "notwithstanding clause" added on to allow the legislature explicitly to pass statutes which bypass 
the Canadian charter. The New Zealand approach – by contrast – could be described as a "legislature first" approach in 
which the courts are explicitly barred from scrutinising clearly expressed Acts of Parliament – as was the case here prior 
to the HRA. 
The Human Rights Act – and in particular the intersection of ss.3 and 4 – was deliberately and carefully crafted to 
differ from both of these models. The issue of judicial deference to the legislature was settled through the intersection of 
these two sections. If they are applied as intended no further doctrine of judicial deference to the legislature (or 
legislation) is required. 
 
The new rules of statutory interpretation 
As is by now well known, the new rule of statutory interpretation in HRA, s.3 is that primary and subordinate 
legislation (where primary legislation requires subordinate legislation to be framed in a certain way) must "be read and 
given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights" but only "so far as it is possible to do so". Where it is 
not possible, the higher courts may issue a "declaration of incompatibility" under s.4(2) of the HRA. 
Two competing views on what is meant by "possible" have emerged. Lord Steyn maintained in R. v A that unless a 
"clear limitation on Convention rights is stated in terms" it should be possible to interpret an Act compatibly with the 
ECHR.
16
 
Lord Hope disagreed. He argued that you have to look at the meaning and purpose of an Act as a whole, not just 
any express intention on behalf of Parliament as to whether it is possible to interpret a statute compatibly with 
Convention rights or not.
17
 On this basis, he thought the reinterpretation his fellow judges made to the post-HRA rape 
shield provisions in the case of A turned the will of Parliament on its head. It reinstated most of the judicial discretion 
which the new Act sought to remove on when to admit evidence of a woman's sexual history with the defendant. 
Accepting Lord Hope's logic, it might have been more appropriate for the courts to have issued a "declaration of 
incompatibility" rather than effectively re-write the new rape shield legislation.
18
 Likewise the same point applies – 
however desirable the outcome in this case – to the re-interpretation (or effectively re-writing ) of the "two strikes and 
you're out" legislation in Offen. What happened in Offen
19
 and A
20
 is that the courts effectively "read-into" the HRA itself 
a new section to replace the current s.3. This section reads something like the following: 
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19
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20
 ibid. at para. 16. 
"With regard to Art. 5 and Art. 6 rights, even if it is not possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights to liberty and a fair trial 
unless a clear limit on a Convention rights is stated in terms."  
The last (italicised) phrase of the clause is a direct quote from Lord Steyn in R. v A
21
; the rest was implicit in the 
approach of the courts in these cases. 
 
Judicial deference 
Where did this scheme come from? It is clearly not inherent in the provisions of the Act itself. The answer is found 
in the judge-made concept of judicial deference which has emerged as a recurring theme in many of the leading post-
HRA decisions, although not always consistently.
22
 One of the most extensive and analytical treatments of the subject is 
found in the judgment in Roth.
23
 For Laws L.J., deference is one of the ways of resolving the tension between 
parliamentary sovereignty and fundamental rights which has arisen in what he sees as the half-way house created by 
the Human Rights Act between legislative supremacy and constitutional supremacy. 
According to this approach the scope of s.3 is determined by the courts' construction of the boundaries of 
deference. As the courts have looked to the concept of deference to shape their interpretative function under the HRA, 
the factors which they cite to determine when and how the courts should defer have, predictably, grown more complex. 
They include rather nebulous notions such as the "culture and conditions of the British State"
24
 as well as more 
definable elements such as whether the rights are absolute or qualified and the subject matter of the issue before the 
court. It is this last factor which, according to Laws L.J. and others, ultimately determines the extent of judicial 
deference. Moreover, the potential spectrum of deference/activism is extremely wide: "in some contexts the deference 
is nearly absolute. In others it barely exists at all".
25
 
Broadly speaking, this spectrum of deference spans from Arts 5 and 6 issues concerning due process and fair trial 
which give rise to the least deference, to national security and "social or economic" matters which the courts are very 
unlikely to scrutinise to any significant degree. This variation is regarded by the judiciary as a natural consequence of 
the differing "special responsibilities" of the two branches of the state: 
"A paradigm of the executive's special responsibility is the security of the State's borders. A paradigm of the 
judiciary's special responsibility is the doing of criminal justice ... And between the special territory of each there 
lies, not a no-mans land, but a spectrum. The degree of deference owed to the democratic decision-maker must 
depend upon where the impugned measure lies within the scheme of things."
26
 
The argument that both institutional and constitutional competence give the courts a greater input in justice issues is a 
persuasive one. As far back as 1993 in an article entitled The Democratic Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights, John 
Wadham and I argued that Arts 5 and 6 of the ECHR
27
 should probably be included in a list of Articles in an incorporated 
Convention which should be judicially determined; the rest being subject to the ultimate say of Parliament aided by the 
scrutiny of a Joint Human Rights Select Committee.
28
 This was largely received as science fiction at the time. 
But whatever arguments there may be in favour of this proposal – or the Canadian approach which is what Lord 
Steyn was effectively re-stating in A – this was not the model that Parliament passed in 1998. If we are going to move 
closer to the Canadian approach this needs to be openly and democratically debated. The danger of proceeding 
through "the backdoor" is a backlash which can which could halt further progress. Misuse of s.3 to effectively re-write 
legislation in justice areas will undermine the careful balance set in motion by the Act. 
Equally, a self-imposed abstinence by the courts from engaging in social policy and national security issues could 
undermine their ability to protect some fundamental rights altogether. As Simon Brown L.J. commented in Roth (notably 
endorsed by Laws L.J. in his judgment in the case): "The court's role under the Human Rights Act is as the guardian of 
human rights. It cannot abdicate this responsibility".
29
 The logic of this argument is that Laws L.J.'s suggestion that in 
some areas deference is "nearly absolute" cannot be supported by the provisions of the Act itself. 
 
The role of s.4 and the dialogue model 
Concluding that there cannot be "no-go" areas for judges under the HRA does not, however, necessarily require 
them to intrude on the rightful role of elected and accountable politicians. The Act was specifically structured to allow 
the courts to uphold rights while also retaining parliamentary authority. Behind the construction of ss.3 and 4 was a 
carefully thought-out constitutional arrangement that sought to inject principles of parliamentary accountability and 
transparency into judicial proceedings without removing whole policy areas to judicial determination. In other words it 
sought to create a new dynamic between the two branches of the State. 
It is this new relationship which the courts have failed to articulate properly, most obviously in the case of R. v A. 
Paradoxically, in the light of that decision, one of the persuasive factors behind the adoption of the UK model was 
Canada's own rape shield case. After years of campaigning for stronger rape shield provisions, the Canadian women's 
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 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 52. 
24
 Laws L.J., Roth para.81. 
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 Roth, para.75. 
26
 Roth, para.77. 
27
 The right to liberty and a fair trial. 
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 "The 'Democratic' Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights, Liberty's Proposals", Public Law, Winter 1993. 
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 Quoted in Roth, para.81. 
movement was stunned when the judicially entrenched Charter of Rights they had also campaigned for overturned 
those provisions as a breach of the right to a fair trial. Only now, the women's movement discovered, it was not possible 
to lobby the judges in the way they had Parliament.
30
 
It was with this experience in mind that the British model was developed. In the academic literature it could be 
called a "dialogue approach" or in the words of Janet Hiebert, a Canadian academic, a "relational approach" in which 
the institutions of the state influence each other, rather than the role of the judiciary being to police or correct the 
"wrong" decisions of the legislature.
31
 
Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, was explicit about this when piloting the Human Rights Bill though the 
Commons: 
"Parliament and the judiciary must engage in a serious dialogue about the operation and development of the 
rights in the Bill ... this dialogue is the only way in which we can ensure the legislation is a living development 
that assists our citizens."
32
 
This vision of the HRA is clearly far more consistent with the approach of Lord Hope than Lord Steyn. To give proper 
effect to the dialogue model requires a rehabilitation of s.4. It requires judges to have the confidence to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility whenever it is "not possible" to apply s.3 and where they deem legislation – any legislation 
– to be incompatible with Convention rights. 
Instead, s.4 has come to be seen by the courts as a measure of last resort because of the presumption that through 
issuing a declaration of incompatibility the courts are effectively forcing the executive, through Parliament, to change the 
law. There were signs of this in Pearson and Martinez
33
 (the prisoners' voting rights case) where deference to the 
legislature was relied upon as part (admittedly a minor part) of the reason for not issuing a declaration of incompatibility 
and by implication in Poplar.
34
 
This logic of this approach does not sit comfortably with Lord Hope's argument in Shayler, that where "compatibility 
cannot be achieved without overruling decisions which have already been taken on the very point at issue by the 
legislator, or if to do so would make the statute unintelligible or unworkable" then "the only option left to the court will be 
to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) of the Act with the consequences that decisions as to 
whether ... and how, to amend the offending legislation, are left to Parliament".
35
 
Note the reference to whether and not when "to amend the offending legislation" following a s.4 declaration. Yet, 
paradoxically, declarations of incompatibility have come to be regarded as if they constituted an expansion of the 
judicial role rather than a means of maintaining the existing separation in the functions of the legislature and the courts. 
This has arisen because there is a widespread, and erroneous, assumption that legislative amendment must follow a 
declaration.
36
 
 
Conclusion 
The rationale of the "dialogue" or "relational" approach flies in the face of the assumption in much of the legal 
literature that the so-called "booby prize"
37
 declaration of incompatibility should automatically trigger legislative change. 
It will not be a sign that the Act has failed when the day comes – as it surely will – that the government, with strong 
parliamentary backing, refuses to amend a statute that the courts declare breach fundamental rights. 
The purpose of the HRA is to allow the courts to apply human rights principles where they were once barred from 
doing so. It was not enacted so that the courts could have the final say in areas where there is no settled human rights 
answer any more than it allows them to abdicate from their responsibility to scrutinise on the grounds that it is outside 
their sphere of competence. 
The outcome of a refusal to amend legislation after a declaration of incompatibility may be a trip to Strasbourg, but 
given the possible application by the European Court of the margin of appreciation the outcome of such a challenge 
may not automatically be a decision against the government. 
It was the prospect of the courts overturning such measures as gun controls laws, tobacco advertising restrictions 
or requirements that freemasons declare their membership – all Labour commitments before they got into power – that 
made the then Labour opposition hesitate about Incorporation for so long. In the unlikely event that the courts were to 
declare that any future legislation outlawing fox hunting, for example, was incompatible with Convention rights 
(disregarding the issue of compensation) then Parliament would be entitled to choose to protect its democratic mandate 
on an issue where the human rights case law is far from settled. Encouraging this kind of "dialogue" was one of the 
purposes of the HRA. 
In reality, regardless of any other consideration, it would be surprising if the courts were to issue such a declaration 
on an issue like fox-hunting. It would probably be regarded by the courts as falling within the realm of "social issues" 
which lie within Parliament's sphere on the deference spectrum. Yet following the rationale of the dialogue model – 
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provided a fundamental right is at stake
38
 – there should be no legislation which the courts automatically bar themselves 
from declaring incompatible with Convention rights solely because the subject matter is deemed by the judges to be 
more in Parliament's field of vision than their own. 
Likewise, Parliament's intention is crucially relevant in determining whether it is possible to interpret legislation 
compatibly with Convention rights. It is not necessarily relevant when judges weigh up whether to declare that in their 
view legislation is incompatible. This is because, as Lord Hope reminds us, there can be no automatic presumption that 
Parliament will agree, and respond accordingly, when a declaration of incompatibility is issued. 
The substitution of differing degrees of deference for the provisions of the Act themselves, therefore, is likely to lead 
the courts to effectively rule out testing the compatibility of some legislation altogether – regardless of the merits of the 
case – on the grounds that it is not within their "special responsibility". That will take them nearer to the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights where the courts are strictly speaking barred from reviewing statutes that are not ambiguously expressed – 
an approach which was rejected here as explicitly as the Canadian one. 
The irony is that if we are not careful we could be faced with the following bizarre scenario: s.3 being interpreted 
along the Canadian model when Arts 5 and 6 are engaged and the New Zealand approach of no judicial review at all 
being effectively inserted into s.4 when social, political or economic factors are said to be dominant. It was because 
these two models were viewed to have swung too far in the direction of judicial entrenchment and democratic deference 
respectively, that the British model was intentionally drafted to be different from both in the first place. 
Rather than construct a complicated new doctrine of judicial deference to the legislature, the courts need only look 
to the provisions themselves. There is no need for judges, legal practitioners or indeed academics to develop complex 
theories of judicial deference if the scheme of the Act is properly appreciated. 
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